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UNITED STATES FIDELITY & 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
v. 
ROBERT SANDT, LINDA SANDT, 
and SEAN SANDT, 
Defendants/Appellees 
Case No. 900601 
Priority 16 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment in the Third 
Judicial District Court, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-3 (3) (j), Utah 
Code Ann. (1987) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the broadly worded and undefined phrase 
"any other collectible insurance" could plausibly be construed to 
include liability insurance or whether it must, under any and all 
circumstances, be interpreted to refer exclusively to 
underinsured motorists coverage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company 
("USF&G"), an insurance company, filed for declaratory judgment 
against appellees (the Sandts), its insured, to determine if 
insurance coverage existed. The appellees counterclaimed asking 
the Court to find that coverage did exist and that no offset was 
available on Sandts1 underinsured motorist coverage for $100,000 
paid to Sandts by a tortfeasor liable for the injuries. 
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of coverage. Appellees filed a Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment to determine that coverage existed and that appellees 
were entitled to the full $300,000 policy limit. 
Judge Uno granted the insureds1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment on both issues. The court found that the policy was 
ambiguous regarding the right of offset; therefore, coverage 
existed and the insurer was obligated to pay the full $300,000 
policy limit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 16, 1989, defendants Robert Sandt and Linda 
Sandt had automobile insurance with USF&G, which included an 
underinsured motor policy limit of $300,000 per person or 
accident. (R. 32). On the night of July 16, 1989, 15-year old 
Sean Sandt, the son of Linda and the step-son of Robert Sandt, 
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was staying at the home of his friend, Dust in Sturges, age 13. 
(R. 33) . Sean was also a member of the Sandt household and an 
insured under the Sandts' USF&G automobile liability policy, 
(R. 32, 279). 
On that same evening, Tony Holder, age 14, and Elijah 
Molitor, age 13, dropped by to visit with Dustin. (R. 33, 279). 
The boys decided to sleep over night at the Sturges house. (R. 
33, 279) . 
After the adults had gone to bed, the four boys (Sean, 
Dustin, Tony, and Elijah) pushed Pamela Sturges1 truck backwards 
out of the driveway and then down the street a few houses with 
the engine off. (R. 33-34, 280). Pamela Sturges had not given 
permission for any of the boys to use the truck. (R. 34). The 
boys proceeded to drive around Park City area over the next 
approximately two hours. (R. 34) . During this time, the boys 
stopped to pick up three girls of approximately the same age as 
the boys. (R. 34) . 
Tony Holder, the sole driver, apparently with the 
intent to scare the girls in the back of the pick-up, started 
driving fast which resulted in the accident at issue, wherein the 
truck rolled at least once. (R. 35) . The truck ended upright 
with it's left rear tire resting on Sean's chest. (R. 280). 
Sean sustained a severe brain injury and remains comatose at this 
date. (R. 280). He is in a persistent vegetative state where 
he neither communicates meaningfully nor moves. (R. 280). Sean 
is totally disabled and will need lifelong medical and nursing 
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care. (R. 280). His medical bills to date are, or will shortly 
be, well in excess of $400,000. (R. 280). 
Pamela Sturges had $100,000 of automobile liability 
coverage with Farmers Insurance, which was paid to the Sandts. 
(R. 36, 281) . Robert and Linda Sandt, on behalf of Sean Sandt, 
made a claim against USF&G for the entire amount of the 
underinsured motorist coverage. (R. 11-13). 
Appellant filed for declaratory judgment against 
appellees, its insured, to determine if insurance coverage 
existed. (R. 2-6). The appellees counterclaimed asking the 
Court to find that coverage did exist. (R. 11-13) . Appellant 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of coverage. 
(R. 28-30). Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to 
determine that coverage existed and that appellees were entitled 
to the full $300,000 policy limit. (R. 118-119). Judge Uno 
granted appellees1 Motion for Summary Judgment on both issues. 
(R. 292-293). Judge Uno found that the policy was ambiguous; 
therefore, coverage existed and appellant was obligated to pay 
the full $300,000 policy limit. (R. 279-291). USF&G eventually 
paid $200,000 of the $300,000, claiming the $100,000 liability 
policy limit Farmers paid on behalf of Sturges should be offset 
from the Sandts1 $300,000 underinsured policy limit. (R. 296). 
Only this latter order was appealed by USF&G. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The "other insurance" section of Sandts1 underinsured 
motorists Sandts1 policy stated that under circumstances where 
an insured is injured while occupying another person's vehicle, 
the underinsured motorists coverage is "excess over any other 
collectible insurance." The phrases "other insurance," "similar 
insurance" and "any other collectible insurance" which are found 
in the "other insurance" section are not defined in the policy. 
These undefined words and phrases are so broad that they can 
plausibly be interpreted to include liability coverage. This 
interpretation makes sense out of the $300,000 policy limit as 
shown in the policy declaration. Unless there were circumstances 
under which the full $300,000 could be paid, the declared policy 
limit would constitute a misrepresentation. 
Sean Sandt was horribly brain damaged while occupying a 
vehicle his family did not own. He collected $100,000 from the 
tortfeasor's liability insurer. Under the "other insurance" 
clause of his policy Appellant promised Sandt that if he was 
injured in a vehicle his family did not own, his underinsured 
motorists coverage would pay in "excess over any other 
collectible insurance." Excess coverage is secondary coverage 
and must be paid after primary coverage limits are exhausted. 
The insurance carrier with the secondary policy is not entitled 
to offset the primary carrier's policy limits. Appellant is not 
entitled to offset the $100,000 Sandt collected from his 
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tortfeasor's liability carrier from the Sandts1 $300,000 "excess" 
or "secondary" policy limit. 
ARGUMENT 
USF&G IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET FOR 
LIABILITY INSURANCE ALREADY PAID TO SEAN SANDT 
A. Standard of Review 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
determining that there is an ambiguity under the "other 
insurance" provision of the insurance policy. In Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P. 2d 714 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
A contract's interpretation may either be a 
question of law, determined by the words of 
the agreement, or a question of fact, 
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. 
If a trial court interprets a contract as a 
matter of law, we accord its construction no 
particular weight, reviewing its action under 
a correctness standard. 
Id. at 716. In the case at hand, the district court determined 
the insurance contract was ambiguous, as a matter of law. 
Therefore, this Court need not give the lower court's 
construction any particular weight, although the ruling was 
clearly correct. Additionally, the court should construe the 
insurance policy in this case as "it would be understood by the 
average, reasonable purchaser of insurance." Draucrhton v. Cuna 
Mut. Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 1105 at 1106, 1108. 
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B. Ambiguity in the Exclusion 
The law which applies to ambiguities in exclusions of 
insurance policies is well settled in Utah. This Court has held 
that ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage and against 
the insurer: 
This Court, similar to courts in many 
jurisdictions, has long subscribed to the 
view that any ambiguity or uncertainty in 
the language of an insurance policy must be 
resolved in favor of coverage. Also, since 
the policy is drawn by the insurer, 
ambiguities are construed against that party, 
(emphasis added) 
LPS Hospital v. Capital Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 at 858 (Utah 
1988). Exclusions are narrowly construed and must be clear to be 
upheld: 
The insurer may exclude from coverage 
certain losses by using language which 
clearly and unmistakably communicates to the 
insured the specific circumstances under 
which the expected coverage will not be 
provided. (emphasis added) 
Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm, 790 P. 2d 581 at 582 (Utah 
App. 1990); see Draughton, supra at 1105-6. Furthermore, the 
reviewing court will: 
...; [i]nterpret the terms of an insurance 
policy according to what [the reviewing 
court] perceive[s] to be the understanding of 
the ordinary purchaser of insurance. Citing 
Totten v. New York Life Ins. Co., 298 Or. 
765, 696 P.2d 1082, 1086 (1985). 
Draughton, supra at 1108. Specifically, "an insurer wishing to 
limit coverage through an exclusion must employ language clearly 
identifying the scope of the limitation." Id. at 1108. And, 
this court should not construe the policy through the "magnifying 
eye of the technical lawyer, .. . but rather as it would be 
understood by one not trained in law or in the insurance 
business." (cites omitted). Id. 
In the present case, on July 16, 1989, Sean Sandt was 
severely injured in Pamela Sturges truck. Sean's parents, Robert 
and Linda Sandt, received $100,000 from Pamela's automobile 
liability coverage with Farmers Insurance. Robert and Linda 
Sandt, on behalf of Sean Sandt, made a claim against USF&G for 
the sum of the underinsured motorist coverage. USF&G eventually 
paid $200,000 of the $300,000, claiming the $100,000 from 
Farmers was a permissible offset from the $3 00,000 underinsured 
policy. 
USF&G claims the offset stems from the provision of 
the policy which states: 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The limit of liability shown in the 
Schedule for this coverage is our maximum 
limit of liability for all damages resulting 
from any one accident. This is the most we 
will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. Covered persons 
2. Claims made 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the 
Declarations; or 
4. Vehicles involved in the accident. 
However, the limit of liability shall be 
reduced by all sums paid because of the 
bodily injury by or on behalf of persons or 
organizations who may be legally responsible. 
This includes all sums paid under Part A of 
this policy. (emphasis added) 
However, as USF&G admits on page 6 of its Brief, citing Sears v. 
Riemersma, 606 P.2d 1206 (1982), "meaning may be obtained by 
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examining the document as a whole." When read together with the 
"Other Insurance" clause of the USF&G policy, in those 
particular circumstances when an insured is an occupant in a 
vehicle his family does not own, the underinsured motorist 
coverage becomes "excess" coverage. The "other insurance" clause 
states: 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable similar 
insurance we will pay only our share of the 
loss. Our share is the proportion that our 
limit of liability bears to the total of all 
applicable limits. However, any insurance we 
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not 
own shall be excess over any other 
collectible insurance, (emphasis added) 
USF&G policy, Attachment A. The term "similar insurance" within 
the meaning of the "Other Insurance" clause does not mean 
"liability insurance," but rather refers to underinsured motorist 
insurance. (Appellant's Brief at 14). 
USF&G admits that there is no Utah case law directly on 
point and that case law from other jurisdictions is "admittedly 
not controlling as the cases are highly dependent upon statutes 
in other states." (Appellant's Brief at 10). USF&G can only 
cite one legal authority that addresses the exact language at 
issue in this case: 2 Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage, §40.1 et seq. (2d Ed.). However, Widiss and USF&G 
readily admit that the language used by appellant can be 
interpreted precisely in the way Sandts and the district court 
did in this case. Widess states at §40.1: 
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The meaning of this aspect of the Other 
Insurance provision might be much less 
obvious were it to be viewed independently of 
the developments of the uninsured motorist 
coverage. (emphasis added) 
The USF&G policy did not contain a section educating the Sandts 
on the "developments of uninsured motorists coverage." It did 
not define the term "other insurance" or "similar insurance." 
Although, Widiss states that judges, lawyers, and 
insurers generally understand this provision, notably missing 
from the above list is the insured! (Appellant's brief at 14). 
By USF&G's own admission the language used in the policy at 
issue can be, and is, interpreted in the way appellees and the 
district court did. 
USF&G's denial of the policy limits and supporting 
analysis is precisely the pitfall this Court was trying to avoid 
when in Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm, it stated that the 
"insurer wishing to limit coverage through an exclusion must 
employ language clearly identifying the scope of the limitation." 
Village Inn, supra at 582. And, that the policy should not be 
construed through the "magnifying eye of the technical lawyer, 
... but rather as it would be understood by one not trained in 
law or in the insurance business." (cites omitted). Id. 
In the case at hand, the Sandts, who are not trained in 
law or in the insurance business, have read a provision in their 
policy which leads them to believe they have excess coverage and 
are entitled to the full $300,000 policy limits. If USF&G had 
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simply used language that eliminated the exact danger that 
Widiss forewarned, then there would not be an ambiguity. 
USF&G makes an interesting argument which illustrates 
how one can easily construe the "other insurance" provision to 
include liability insurance. It argues that the basic concept of 
underinsured motorist coverage is to place the insured injured 
party in the same position of coverage that he would have been in 
had the tortfeasor possessed liability insurance in the amount of 
the underinsured policy limit, citing Higgins v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 770 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1989). (Appellant's Brief at 9). 
In that respect underinsured motorists coverage and liability 
coverage are "similar." Because USF&G did not define the term, a 
plausible interpretation is that "similar insurance" includes 
liability insurance. That argument in light of the facts of this 
case shows exactly why the underinsured coverage should be excess 
coverage. Mrs. Sturges had $100,000 coverage with Farmer's 
Insurance. Liability coverage on the vehicle is always primary 
coverage, meaning that it pays out first. If the driver and 
tortfeasor in this case, Tony Holder, had $300,000 liability 
coverage it would have been secondary-excess coverage. Sandts 
could have recovered $400,000. If the Court doesn't require 
USF&G to pay it's entire $300,000 policy limit, then Sean Sandt 
will not be placed in the same position as if the tortfeasor 
(Holder) had possessed liability coverage in the amount of the 
underinsured policy limit i.e. $300,000! 
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Furthermore, the declarations page of the policy 
creates an ambiguity and strong public policy argument concerning 
the payment of underinsured motorists coverage. Notice that the 
limit is $300,000 for which the insured pays an additional 
premium of $7.00. The same amount paid for unisured motorist 
coverage (see attachment B) . This figure, without further 
explanation on the declarations page, gives the insured the 
impression he will recover $300,000 from his own insurance 
company if his injuries are severe enough. If the insurance 
company is entitled to an offset for any and all liability 
insurance paid, the underinsured policy limit of $300,000, as 
stated in the declarations page, would make no sense. The 
company would never be under an obligation to pay the full 
$300,000. They would only pay $300,000 if the tortfeasor was 
uninsured, not underinsured. 
Mr. Sandt also had $300,000 of uninsured motorists 
coverage for which he paid an additional premium of $7.00. The 
declarations page is therefore ambiguous and misleading, unless, 
under some circumstance, the insurance company becomes obligated 
to pay the full $300,000 of underinsured motorists coverage. If 
the company has to pay the full $300,000 when the insured is 
injured occupying a vehicle other than his own, then the 
declarations page can be read in harmony with the rest of the 
policy. 
Because the policy in question has two or more possible 
meanings, the clause is ambiguous. Under one interpretation, 
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USF&G is allowed an offset for liability coverage collected. 
Under another interpretation underinsured motorist coverage is 
considered "excess" to liability coverage collected when an 
injured insured is occupying a vehicle other than his own. The 
ambiguity must "be resolved in favor of coverage." LPS 
Hospital, 765 P.2d at 858. Therefore, Sandts are entitled to 
the excess coverage. 
C With Excess Coverage USF&G Must Pay the Policy Limits 
It is well understood that excess coverage is insurance 
over or in addition to other insurance. In Maine Bonding v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296, 298 Or. 514 (1985), the 
court stated: 
The excess carrier's obligation to pay begins 
when the primary insurer's ends - when the 
limits of the primary policy are exhausted. 
In this respect, the potential liability of 
the excess insurer is identical to that of an 
insured who has no excess coverage. The 
excess carrier is liable for the amount of 
any judgment in excess of the primary policy, 
up to the limits of the excess carrier's 
coverage. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 13 00. Therefore, in the present case, USF&G is liable 
for the full policy limits, which is $300,000. They are not 
entitled to an offset of $100,000 paid by the primary carrier. 
CONCLUSION 
USF&G's "Other Insurance" clause is ambiguous at best. 
The broad, undefined phraseology "excess over any other 
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collectible insurance" could certainly be interpreted to mean 
that Sandts 1 underinsured motorist policy provided excess 
coverage over the liability insurance previously collected. This 
ambiguity must be construed against USF&G. Because the damages 
in this case are admittedly in excess of $400,000 USF&G should be 
required to pay its full $300,000 policy limit. The decision of 
the District Court should be affirmed. 
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A - IP 
<ttV 1979 UNDERINSURED 
MOTORISTS 
COVERAGE 
Limit of Liability 
SCHEDULE 
Auto 1 
Premium 
Auto 2 
(Ed. 6-80) 
Auto 3 
each accident $ $ $ 
We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner 
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by a covered person; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the underinsured motor vehicle. 
We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily 
injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settle-
ments. 
"Covered person" as used in this endorsement means: 
1. You or any family member. 
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto. 
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury 
to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above. 
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type to which 
a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident but its limit for 
bodily injury liability is less than the limit of liability for this coverage. 
However, "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include any vehicle or equipment: 
1. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident 
but its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit for bodily injurv 
liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which your covered 
auto is principally garaged. 
2. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family member. 
3. Owned by any governmental unit or agency. 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads. 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not upon public roads. 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises. 
7. Owned or operated by a person qualifying as a self-insurer under any applicable 
motor vehicle law. 
8. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident 
but the bonding or insuring company: 
a. denies coverage; or 
b. is or becomes insolvent. 
EXCLUSIONS 
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any 
person: 
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by you or any family 
member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy. This includes a trailer 
of any type used with that vehicle. 
2. While occupying your covered auto when it is being used to carry persons or proper-
ty for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense car pool. 
3. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so. 
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit any insurer or self-insurer 
under any of the following or similar law: 
1. workers' compensation law; or 
2. disability benefits law. 
PP03 11 (Ed. .-6-80) 
Page I of 2 
<8 PP03 11 (Ed. 6-80) ©"'$&*' 1979 _ _ . 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The limit of liability shown in the Schedule for this coverage is our maximum limit of 
liability for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay 
regardless of the number of: 
1. Covered persons; 
2. Claims made; 
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. Vehicles involved in the accident. 
However, the limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums paid because of the bodily injury 
by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes 
all sums paid under Part A of this policy. 
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this coverage shall be reduced by all 
sums paid or payable because of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar 
law: 
1. workers'compensation law; or 
2. disability benefits law. 
Any payment under this coverage will reduce any amount that person is entitled to recover 
under Part A of this policy. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our 
share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits. 
However, any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess 
over any other collectible insurance. 
ARBITRATION 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this endorsement, 
or 
2. As to the amount of damages; 
either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select 
an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they cannot agree within 30 days, 
either may request tfcat selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each 
party will: 
1. Pay the expenses it incurs; and 
2. Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally. 
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the county in which the 
covered person lives. Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply. A decision 
agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding as to: 
1. Whether the covered person is legally entitled to recover damages; and 
2. The amount of damages. This applies only if the amount does not exceed the mini-
mum limit for bodily injury liability specified by the financial responsibility law of the 
state in which your covered auto is principally garaged. If the amount exceeds that limit, 
either party may demand the right to a trial. This demand must be made within 60 days 
of the arbitrators' decision. If this demand is not made, the amount of damages agreed 
to by the arbitrators will be binding. 
ADDITIONAL DUTY 
Any person seeking coverage under this endorsement must also promptly send us copies 
of the legal papers if a suit is brought. 
This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is written. 
c 
UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
COVERAGE EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT 
PP 04 05 01 88 
The following exclusion is added to Uninsured Motorists Coverage and, where afforded, 
Underinsured Motorists Coverage: 
We do not provide coverage for punitive or exemplary damages. 
This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is 
written. 
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